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Book Reviews
BASIC PROTECTION FOR THE TRAFFIC VICTIM: A Blueprint
For Reforming Automobile Insurance. By Robert E. Keeton
and Jeffrey O'Connell. Little, Brown and Company, Boston and
Toronto: 1965. Pp. i-xv and 1-624, including index. $13.50.
There have been many proposals advanced in recent years for
reforming this country's system of determining who bears the cost of
automobile accidents, but none has the meticulous detail of the Basic
Protection Plan devised by law professors Keeton (Harvard) and
O'Connell (Illinois). Foretastes of their plan have been presented in
published articles' and in many formal and informal talks. The
complete details are now available in a book which also surveys other
reform proposals and analyzes automobile accident compensation systems currently in use here and abroad.
Under the authors' proposal, a person injured in a motor vehicle
accident would make a claim for "basic protection benefits" to obtain
compensation for his injuries. The claim would be made to, and if
litigation were necessary suit would be brought against, an insurance
company, in most cases the company from whom the claimant purchased basic protection coverage.2 The injured person would be
entitled to such benefits whether or not his injuries were caused by
anyone's negligence or other fault. Basic protection benefits compensate the injured person only for his economic losses (typically medical
expenses and lost earnings), and part of those are not covered: there
is a deductible equal to $100 of net economic loss of all types, or 10
per cent of loss from inability to work, whichever is greater. Damages
for pain and suffering are not provided as basic protection benefits, but
additional insurance may be purchased by a motorist to compensate himself and his family for harm of that sort. It will also be possible for an
injured person to maintain a tort action in which he would be allowed
to recover compensation for pain and suffering to the extent that his
damages therefor exceed $5,000. In the tort action the injured person would have to prove that someone else was liable to him under
existing principles of tort law. The tort action would proceed just
as it does at present, but there would be no recovery therein for
amounts payable as basic protection benefits or (as previously noted)
for the first $5,000 of damages for pain and suffering. In such a tort
action the claimant would also be allowed to recover his economic
losses in excess of $10,000, his loss arising from the $100 deductible
feature and compensation for property damage. (Property damage is
not covered by basic protection benefits.) In contrast to the present
automobile tort claims system, under which all benefits are usually paid
1. Keeton and O'Connell, Basic Protection - A Proposal for Improving Automobile Claims Systems, 78 HARV. L. lRv. 329 (1964) ; Keeton and O'Connell, A Basic
Protection Insurance Act for Claims of Traffic Victims, 2 HARV. J. LEGls. 41 (1965).
2. If the claimant is not the owner of an insured car, the claim would usually be
brought against the company from whom the owner purchased basic protection coverage.
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in a lump sum, basic protection benefits would be paid each month, as
the injured person's losses accrue. Basic protection benefits would be
financed by insurance which would have to be obtained on a motor
vehicle before it could be registered. Minimum coverage would be
$10,000 per person, $100,000 per accident.
In summary, the Keeton-O'Connell plan involves compulsory
automobile insurance compensating a traffic victim for his economic
losses up to $10,000 whether or not anyone was at fault in the accident. This contrasts with the system presently found in this country
where the victim may recover damages for pain and suffering as well
as for economic losses, but only if he can prove that someone was at
fault (and in most states, only if he himself was free of contributory
fault).
This review's summary hardly does justice to the authors' plan,
since it leaves out so many of its important details. The interested
reader may consult one of the several summaries of the plan contained
in the book itself.' The presentation of their plan in detail, complete
with a draft statute in ready-to-enact form, is unique among the more
recent American reform proposals. The plans of other reformers have
simply been outlined. Keeton and O'Connell are to be commended for
working out the details of their plan, a task which must have taken
uncounted hours. Of course the presence of so much detail makes the
reader's task difficult. The book is not recommended for a light evening's reading. Moreover, the book's presentation is at times labored.
An example of this may be found in the discussion of reform
plans advanced by other scholars. Keeton and O'Connell frequently
point out that someone else's plan has not given a precisely formulated
solution to a particular problem, with a resulting ambiguity. They
then perform a detailed analysis which (1) proves that the ambiguity
exists; (2) presents the range of its possible meanings; and (3)
laboriously decides which meaning the original author probably intended. The problem and its solution are handled solely by analysis of
"internal" evidence, i.e., by considering the language used by its author.
"Maybe he meant A, maybe he meant B. He probably meant A because. . .

."

This excessive concentration on textual analysis is occa-

sionally relieved by the simple expedient of an inquiry directed by
Keeton-O'Connell to the author of the work under analysis. But other
ambiguities in the same work are all too frequently resolved only by
Keeton and O'Connell's analysis of the other author's published
writing, rather than by asking the other author to resolve them.
The excessive focus on resolving conflicts in abstract ideas, which
Keeton and O'Connell reveal in their analysis of other reform proposals, may perhaps be related to a far greater failing. This involves
their handling of one of the main arguments in support of their
proposal. The argument is that the basic protection plan will provide
a better distribution of the insurance dollar than the existing system.
A large portion of the automobile premium dollar now goes to pay the
3. For a brief summary, see
Tnx TRAFFIC VICTIM 6-10 (1965).
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For an expanded version of the foregoing summary,
see pp. 273-95. A detailed discussion, keyed to the sections of their proposed statute,
is found at pp. 386-482.
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costs of administering the compensation system, rather than to compensate the traffic victim for losses directly attributable to the accident.
The basic protection plan, it is said, will reduce administrative costs
by eliminating much of the expense of adjusting and adjudicating
controversies over fault. Such expenses include fees of claims adjusters, defense attorneys, and plaintiffs' attorneys. The services of
these persons would not be entirely eliminated by the enactment of the
basic protection plan, but their role (and consequently the share of the
insurance premium dollar ultimately received by them) would be
significantly decreased. In addition, the costs to society resulting from
subsidization of the court system would be lessened by reduction in
the number of lawsuits as a result of a decrease in the number of
controversies over fault.
Although the contention that administrative costs will be reduced
as outlined in the preceding paragraph seems reasonable, the book does
not present detailed cost projections and comparisons. After the first
295 pages, where the theme of lower administrative costs constantly
recurred, only three pages (295-98) are set aside for special discussion
of the costs of the Basic Protection Plan. The most notable feature of
these pages is the absence of a facts-and-figures discussion. The authors
have therefore failed to resolve the essential question, which is how
much costs will be reduced. That question will have to be answered
before the plan can be put into effect, because actuaries will have to take
account of such costs when rates are set for the insurance policies which
are the foundation upon which the authors' entire plan rests.
The authors' inclusion of certain features of their plan may
operate to make the reduction in administrative costs not quite so
extensive as might otherwise have been the case. One such provision
is related to the deductible feature of the basic protection plan. Even
though the first $100 of economic loss is deducted from his basic protection claim, the victim retains his right to recover this $100 by bringing a tort action. The authors deal with the effect of this on administrative costs as follows:
It seems unlikely that victims will press claims for this $100
in any substantial number of cases, or that the cases that do arise
will be tried so as to consume much court time. Unless the loss
has occurred under peculiarly aggravating circumstances, ordinarily a victim will choose to forget such a claim. In that event
he will bear the first $100 of loss himself.4
The authors' contention that victims will tend not to press their $100
tort claims is not self evident. Study of claims experience under
existing practices could no doubt produce data which would permit
reasonable projections of the frequency of claims of that size. In projecting the total administrative cost of the basic protection system it
will be necessary to take account of the cost of processing any $100
insurance claim. Since a tort claim will ordinarily be pressed against
4. Id. at 276.
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an insurance carrier other than the basic protection carrier, two personal injury claims files will have to be opened in most cases where a
basic protective claim and a tort claim are made by an injured person one file by the basic protection insurer, the other by the tort insurer.
Moreover the tort insurer will have to prepare its claim file in a way
which will permit it to make a determination of fault. The fault
question has therefore not been eliminated even in the personal injury
aspects of the proposed basic protection system. Fault questions will
also be preserved in property damage cases, since the authors leave the
present system of handling property damage untouched by their basic
protection proposal.
Even if litigation is not required to dispose of tort claims for
property damage and for the $100 basic protection deductible, there
still remains a potentially large administrative cost factor. Figures on
the probable cost of handling such claims could no doubt have been
obtained, and a detailed presentation and analysis of them would have
been in order. In view of the high percentage of claims which would
probably be settled, the costs of administering claims settlement activities may render the added costs of litigation insignificant. However,
the possibility of at least some tort litigation, with its attendant costs,
should not be discounted. Many attorneys now litigate automobile
property damage cases on behalf of insurance carriers seeking to recover on a collision insurance subrogation claim. Such claims are
usually small. This shows that it is possible for attorneys to be involved in handling tort claims for small amounts. When the claimant
is covered by collision insurance, his claim for the $100 economic loss
deductible from his basic protection recovery plus his claim for the
amount deductible under his collision coverage for property damage
may produce a sufficiently large figure to justify litigation. The likelihood of this would be increased if the attorney handling the insured's
tort claim also handled the insurance company's subrogation claim.
Thus, the basic protection system may not substantially reduce
the administrative costs of the total automobile accident compensation
system, since tort claim files may still have to be maintained, and
since litigation of some of them is possible. The authors' failure to
handle these problems adequately rests not so much in their failure to
mention them as in their failure to study the present claims system
in quantitative terms, and to use the data derived from such an examination to project cost figures for their system and to compare such
figures with the cost of the present system. Such a study could be
conducted on the basis of a small sample of cases and would by no
means require an examination of every insurance company's complete
claims experience.
The numerous details of the authors' plan which have not been
mentioned in this review will significantly influence the judgment many
people will levy on the plan. Many of the details will raise controversy,
such as the provision for awarding attorneys' fees to claimants who
sue to obtain basic protection benefits. The significance of other details
may not be readily apparent. For example, at two places where the key
features of the plan are summarized the authors state that "In general
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the basic protection system preserves present tort claims procedures,
including jury trial, for settling and litigating claims.. . ."' This might
be taken to mean that in the average suit by a claimant against an
insurance company for basic protection benefits there would be a right
to jury trial. Actually, as the text on page 294 reveals, there is a right
of jury trial only if the amount in controversy is at least $5,000.6

One of the authors' fundamental premises is, of course, that cases
involving such large amounts of economic loss are on the average
quite infrequent. Therefore, by the authors' own premise, the right to
jury trial will not have been preserved in most cases where suit is
brought to obtain -basic protection benefits.
The plan has been formulated not only to solve the problems the
authors detect in the present system, but to do so in a way which
stands a realistic chance of legislative enactment. Many of the plan's
features and of the book's arguments can ,be explained by the authors'
desire to propose a plan which is politically acceptable. Preservation
of tort litigation for the more serious cases seems justifiable primarily
on this ground. And the authors take pains to note that basic protection insurance will ,be marketable through existing insurance channels. Thus, insurance companies, insurance brokers, and plaintiffs'
and defendants' attorneys are all given a place under the new scheme.
It will be interesting to see whether the plan is adopted anywhere.
For myself, I am not yet convinced that it should be. There are too
many questions as to its effects which have not been given satisfactory
answers, especially those relating to costs. It does, however, deserve
careful study.
R. Wayne Walker*
Detention Of The Mentally Disordered. By Barry B. Swadron.
Butterworth & Co., Ltd., Canada: 1964. Pp. 450, with appendix,
table of cases, table of statutes, and index. $15.00.
Today, more than ever before, there is an increased concern about
any encroachment upon civil liberties. Associated with this concern,
there is naturally a renewed interest in the forceful detention of the
mentally ill,' which is reflected in recent court decisions, Maryland's
own efforts to revise the criminal code, 2 the reconsideration of our
mental health laws in the wake of the Durham decision,3 the writings
5. Id. at 10 and 293. (Italics in original.)
6. The authors discuss the constitutional problems concerning the modification of
the right to jury trial on pp. 493-504.
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Maryland Law School; A.B. 1956,
LL.B. 1960, University of California, Berkeley.
1. Hearings before the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate
Committee on the Judiciary on Constitutional Rights of the Mentally Ill, 87th Cong.,
1st Sess. (1961).
2. The General Assembly of Maryland has recently granted funds to establish
a commission to study and review the criminal law, procedure and administration.
LAWS oF MD. ch. 138 (1966).
3. Durham v. United States, 214 F.2d 862 (D.C. Cir. 1954).
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of Dr. Thomas Szasz,4 the Report of the Joint Commission on Mental
Illness and Health,5 the Community Mental Health Centers Act,6 and
recent progress in the treatment of the mentally ill, to mention only a
few. All of these factors make this book a most useful and timely
volume, not only as a source of guidelines for the drafting of new
legislation, 7 but also as an impetus in fostering greater understanding
of the entire subject of the detention of the mentally ill.
In this book the author, a member of the Ontario Bar (LL.B.
and LL.M.) has covered the entire gamut of laws concerning the
hospitalization, detention and release of the mentally ill, the dilemma
of the mentally ill criminal and related laws concerning the mentally
defective. For their comparative and informational value, he quotes
frequently from the applicable parts of the British Mental Health Act,
1959, and the United States Draft Act Governing Hospitalization of
the Mentally Ill.' The extensive use of illustrative case material,
appeals decisions, samples of the actual forms used under the various
laws, and newspaper clippings greatly enhances the value of the book
by instilling in the reader a greater feel for the issues involved and
the reasoning behind many of the laws.
However, it is the laws of Canada and its provinces which serve as
the focal point of all the author's discussions. To this reviewer, who is
not a lawyer but a psychiatrist, it was revealing to note that, although
some diversity exists among the provinces, there seems to be far more
unity amongst provincial laws than amongst the state laws of the
United States." The contrast between state and provincial law was
also enlightening because it indicated that many of our states have not
revised their commitment laws in accordance with recent advances in
the care of the mentally ill, as has been done in many Canadian
provinces.' 0
That Mr. Swadron is a lawyer is obvious both from the legal
detail of his work and from the subject matter of his discussions.
However, from the viewpoint of a forensic psychiatrist, it is also
obvious that he is a friend of the mentally ill and quite aware of not
only what modern psychiatry has to offer the law and society, but
also its limitations. It is his understanding of both disciplines which
makes his commentary so valuable.
4. SZAsz, LAW, LIBERTY AND PSYCHIATRY (1963); SZASZ, MYTH Olt MENTAL
ILLNESS (1961).
5. JOINT COMMISSION ON MENTAL ILLNESS AND HEALTH, ACTION FOR MENTAL
HEALTH - FINAL REPORT (1961).
6. Mental Retardation Facilities Construction Act, 70 Stat. 717 (1963), 42

U.S.C. §§ 292-92i (1964).

7. The Legislative Council of Maryland has hired Donald C. Allen to review the
entire Health Code (MD. CODE ANN. art. 43) and the Mental Health Code (MD. CODE
ANN. art. 59) and the Council presently has this report under consideration.
8. PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE PUBLICATION, DRAPt AcT - GOVERNING HOSPITALI-

ZATION OF THE MENTALLY ILL 51 (1952).
9. LINDMAN AND MCINTYR, THE MENTALLY DISABLED AND THE LAW - THE
REPORT OV THE AMERICAN BAR FOUNDATION ON THE RIGHTS Or THE MENTALLY ILL

(1962).

10. CORNELL LAW SCHOOL, MENTAL ILLNESS AND DuE PROCESS, REPORT AND
RECOMMENDATIONS ON ADMISSIONS TO MENTAL HOSPITALS UNDER NEW YORK LAW

(1962).
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Mr. Swadron begins his treatise with an examination of the
various statutes concerning the voluntary patient and then describes
the procedures necessary for regular certification, the pre-condition of
involuntary commitment. He raises an important point which is stirring more and more interest in our courts and legislatures, whose
awareness has been stimulated by the goading of a proliferating number of psychiatrists, when he states that "the legislatures give the
power to medical practitioners as a class to the exclusion of none
within that class, to certify the mental disorder of any persons."' 1
While conceding the practical considerations which have produced this
most frequently used procedure for hospitalization, he pointedly emphasizes its pitfalls. After all, it does in fact take only two physicians'
signatures to at least bring about an initial confinement. Should the
opinion of two be taken as a reliable indication of the consensus of
professional judgment? It is noteworthy that most Canadian provinces
further require that a patient who has been certified be admitted to a
mental institution only after its Superintendent agrees to accept him.
In Maryland, such a patient is usually admitted first and then remains
committed for several days while his case is evaluated by the staff.
In most Canadian provinces the signed certificates are sufficient authority to any person to convey the patient to the institution and for
the authorities thereof to detain him. In many American jurisdictions
the police require that simple charges be docketed before they will
become involved.
Several provinces require legal procedures, which are in the nature
of judicial review, in addition to certification by two physicians' certificates. In Alberta, the certificates must first be submitted to a justice
of the peace. In British Columbia and Quebec, the patient must be
personally examined by a judge who also reads the certificates. Such
procedures have evoked a strong desire in medical circles to avoid the
involvement of courts, judges, and juries in the commitment procedure.
After all, is not this a medical situation? Does the appearance of a
mentally-ill person before a judge or magistrate offer any real protection
of his civil rights ?
In discussing the test for certification, Mr. Swadron finds:
In the end result, I can find no direct authority which requires
the doctor to be satisfied to an extent which is beyond a reasonable
doubt that the individual is certifiably mentally disordered. But
I must admit that I would feel uneasy if a doctor certified a person
on the basis that it would be the best thing to do, notwithstanding
he could probably satisfactorily remain in the community."2
The specific qualifications of the two certifying physicians vary
greatly among the provinces. In some provinces one of the physicians
may be on the hospital staff (not allowed in Maryland). One province
requires at least one of the physicians to have some special knowledge
11.

SWADRON, DETENTION Ol THE MENTALLY

12. Id. at 51.

DisoRDERE 22 (1964).
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of mental illness (not necessarily a phychiatrist). Many more specific
limitations apply where a commitment is to a private institution.
After his thorough consideration of the certification process,
Mr. Swadron shifts to an examination of the post-commitment requirements. For example, following the period immediately after commitment, a superintendent's authorization is usually required for extended
detention. The approval of an independent jury or review board may
also be required to detain a patient beyond a short period of time.
The question of the duration of the patient's stay and the frequency
of statutorily-determined re-examinations is considered in some detail.
While many of our states have these same requirements, they often
degenerate into meaningless routines.
In concluding his survey of commitment laws, the author reminds
us of the function which they serve and the standard by which they
should be measured:
It is the aim of every jurisdiction that all persons who should
be confined in mental hospitals are so confined. All the provinces
of Canada have legislation authorizing the detention of persons
under medical certification or judicial order based upon such certification, the procedures of which were discussed in the previous
chapters. Medical certification pre-supposes an examination by a
medical practitioner. Legislation should provide authority for the
bringing together of the medical practitioner and the person alleged
to be mentally disordered. It should also provide for the relaxation
of standard procedures to facilitate admission to mental hospitals
in cases of emergency. The laws in this area may only be considered adequate if any factual situation which may arise can be
dealt with in an expedient fashion and with a minimum of
difficulty.'"
The dire consequences of inadequate legislation are emphasized through
the use of case histories.
In dealing with mental illness and the criminal law, new problems
arise. In Canada, for example, the criminal law is national and uniform throughout the country. However, there are no federal mental
hospitals or penal mental hospitals. The courts and prisons are then
required to use provincial hospitals and the proper care of some of
these patients may depend more on the degree of cooperation of various
officials than upon the patient's needs.
Of course the fundamental legal problem in this area is the establishment of an adequate test for criminal insanity. The Canadian test
represents a more modern and liberal approach than the time-honored
M'Naghten Rule. Swadron describes the Canadian approach:
Under the Canadian statute law a disease of the mind that
renders the accused person incapable of an appreciation of the
nature and quality of the act must necessarily involve more than
mere knowledge that the act is being committed; there must be an
13. Id. at 210.
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appreciation of the factors involved in the act and a mental capacity to measure and foresee the consequences of the violent
conduct ....

14

The shortcomings of the M'Naghten Rule have repeatedly asserted. As
Sir David Henderson has noted:
In melancholia, schizophrenia, paranoid states, general paralysis, senile dementia, epilepsy with insanity, and many others ....
the individual's mind is sufficiently clear to know what he is doing,
but at the same time the true significance of his conduct is not
appreciated either in relation to himself or others ......
Under the Canadian rule, the restrictive interpretations of the "wrong",
which typify the M'Naghten Rule, are avoided.
In Canada a person is sane until insanity is proven."6 The jury is
usually instructed to find insanity on a "mere preponderance of probability."' 7 Recent Maryland decisions' 8 have transferred the responsibility of proving sanity to the state once a "reasonable doubt" has been
raised by the defense as to counter the presumption of sanity. Following an insanity acquittal in Canada, "a person who is acquitted on
account of insanity is not discharged into the community, no matter
what his mental condition is at the time of the verdict."' 9 He is kept
in strict custody in a prison until the pleasure of the lieutenant-governor
of the province is known. He is then generally ordered to a mental
hospital by the lieutenant-governor and can only be released with his
permission.
The issues of fitness to stand trial and the insanity plea are discussed in detail and the author presents an excellent review of all the
material on these two subjects. Mr. Swadron raises the subtle point
that there is no appeal from an acquittal by reason of insanity. Since
such an acquittal leaves the conclusion that the person did commit the
act, someone might want to appeal to foster his claim that he did not
commit the act.20 For those found not guilty by reason of insanity,
Mr. Swadron leans toward the use of hospitalization for the observation. He quotes from a study conducted by the Northwestern University Law Review where this reviewer is quoted at variance with many
of his colleagues as saying that 40-50% of such cases, called to the
psychiatrist's attention, can be screened successfully without hospitalization provided an adequate history is available. 2' The majority of those
who were of a contrary opinion seem to be psychiatrists whose major
experience was in hospital work.
14. Id. at 354. The author is referring to CAN. STAT. ch. 51, § 16 (1953-54).

15. SWADRON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 360-61.
16. Id. at 356.
17. Id. at 363.
18. Fowler v. State, 237 Md. 508, 206 A.2d 802 (1965) ; Bradford v. State, 234

Md. 505, 200 A.2d 150 (1964).
19. SWADRON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 365.
20. Id. at 367-68.
21. Id. at 259 where the author quotes from Note, Compulsory Commitment
Following a Successful Insanity Defense, 56 Nw. U.L. Rzv. 409, 465-66 (1961).
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As in most states, a Canadian Court cannot order hospitalization
after conviction, but the person must first be sent to a prison and then
transferred usually on order of the lieutenant-governor of the province.
To this point, Mr. Swadron speaks clearly that a court should have the
jurisdiction to order hospitalization as is now done in England. The
defects of the existing procedure are clear:
When an individual is going through the criminal trial
process, he is the center of attention, and an excellent opportunity
is afforded of observing the needs of his particular case. Once he
is sent to prison, however, he becomes one of many, and any
transfer to a mental hospital in his case depends22 upon the ability
of the correctional authorities to single him out.
This, of course, raises the question of applying hospital time to sentence time. In Canada, hospital time is counted against sentence time,
a condition that was only recently remedied in Maryland.23
Although the use of the comparative technique in his analysis of
the law is excellent, the author might have improved the clarity of his
presentation by reducing this voluminous analysis to chart form at
some point.2 Otherwise, his presentation is comprehensive and informative. I personally found reading this book a valuable experience.
It should be useful as a reference source and as a basis of stimulating
thinking in this area for both legal and medical scholars.
Jonas R. Rappeport,M.D.*
22. SWADRON, op. cit. supra note 11, at 449.
23. MD. COD ANN. art. 27, §§ 698, 700 (Cun. Supp. 1965).
24. LINDMAN AND MCINTYaz, op. cit. supra note 9.
* M.D., 1952 University of Maryland; Certified American Board of Psychiatry
& Neurolgy, 1959; Court Psychiatrist, Circuit Court for Baltimore County; Assistant
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry, University of Maryland Medical School.

